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Chapter 20
Global Trade in Stolen Culture and Nature
as Neocolonial Hegemony
Simon Mackenzie, Annette Hübschle and Donna Yates
Abstract
In this chapter, we first argue for a green criminological perspective on
culture as well as nature, as those concepts are framed in the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals. Second, from within this green crimino-
logical perspective we discern a neocolonial hegemony in the resource
extraction from developing countries that is represented by international
trafficking markets in looted cultural heritage and poached wildlife. In other
words, developed nations benefit from these trades while developing nations
suffer, and governance regimes attempting to control these global criminal
trades prioritise the rational interests and cultural norms of the more
powerful market nations over the local interests and cultural histories of
communities at the source of the chain of supply. Finally, our third argument
is that the emerging intellectual framework of sustainable development, as
represented in the UN’s goals, may provide a perspective on the issue of
trafficking culture and nature that can push back against the neocolonial
hegemony of international criminal markets such as these.
Keywords: Cultural heritage; wildlife trafficking; transnational crime;
neocolonialism; sustainable development and political economy; natural
heritage; green criminology; environmental justice; local communities
Introduction
The collection of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 indicators is
the latest United Nations instalment in a long row of measures aimed at facili-
tating pathways to sustainable development for all of the world’s citizens. The
United Nations General Assembly launched the SDGs in 2015 as part of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. The SDGs stretch from potable water and
sanitation for all to ending global poverty, but the focus of our chapter is on the
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target in SDG 11.4, which aims to ‘strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the
world’s cultural and natural heritage’. For critical researchers who study
trafficking crimes in antiquities and wildlife, this goal is good to see. At the same
time, it skates on some thin ice beneath which the waters run deep. As we shall
develop at more length in this chapter, the notion of ‘heritage’ is a contested
concept, deeply anchored in colonial discourses, while the associated concepts of
‘preservation’, ‘conservation’ and ‘protection’ are linked to global policies that
have been disparaged by critical scholars as paternalistic and one-sided (Garland,
2008; Ramutsindela, 2006; White, 2014).
For antiquities trafficking, the international policy narrative has in fact been
framed in terms of strengthening protection efforts since at least 1970, when the
main international convention that continues to govern this type of crime, the
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, noted that ‘it is
incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural property existing within its
territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit export’
and that States should
…undertake to oppose such practices with the means at their
disposal, and particularly by removing their causes, putting a
stop to current practices, and by helping to make the necessary
reparations. (UNESCO 1970)
Meanwhile, wildlife trafficking has been subject to a system of trade regulation
since the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and
Flora (CITES) came into force in 1975. While the UNESCO Convention deals
with antiquities trafficking overtly, CITES provides a regulatory framework for
international trade in endangered wildlife species. The principal aim of the
multilateral environmental agreement is to ensure that international trade in
specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten the survival of the species
in the wild, and it accords degrees of protection to nearly 36,000 species of ani-
mals and plants. The question arises then: what if anything does the latest framing
of these issues as SDGs add to the international policy movement to combat these
two contemporary forms of transnational crime?
The ethics of dealing in and collecting antiquities is a debate that has been
significantly influenced for too long by the powerful voices of those with vested
interests in the trade. The framework by which we come to understand antiquities
trafficking, which we will hereafter refer to as ‘trafficking culture’ (see Mackenzie,
Brodie, Yates, & Tsirogiannis, 2019), is in significant part a hegemonic liberal
market discourse that marginalises and misrepresents the interests of local
communities livingwith or near the heritage in question – that is to say, in themarket
discourse, ‘at source’ (of the chain of supply). The same applies to the poaching and
illegal harvesting of animals and plants, which are often intricately linked to the
livelihood strategies and food security of local communities, but in respect of
which the international regulatory framework assumes a norm of free trade
and international movement. Can the conceptual framework of sustainable
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development provide a counterbalance to these market-oriented discourses? Can it
help to provide clarity on the resolution of previously intractable debates between
the seemingly incomparable poles ofmarket trade and environmental protection? In
this chapter, wewill consider the extent towhich thatmight be the case. First, wewill
make an argument for considering trafficking culture, as well as trafficking nature,
from the perspective of green criminology. Next, we will use that green crimino-
logical perspective to consider trafficking in culture and nature as examples of a
trade-based neocolonial hegemony. In our version of this argument, both the global
trafficking in culture/nature and the international regulatory responses to these
transnational crimes display such hegemonic qualities. Third, and finally, we will
look to the SDGs and the vision of sustainable development for intellectual tools to
resist the neocolonial hegemony of these markets.
We argue in this chapter that the global systems represented by antiquities
looting, trafficking and market collection, and the illegal hunting of wildlife,
trafficking and trade, are models for an unsustainable type of development – both
for the source countries from which the items are extracted in a destructive
manner for short-term economic gain and for the wealthier market countries
where the social and moral fabric is warped by the normalisation of the cultural
celebration of illicitly obtained goods. Thinking about illicit trade only in terms of
markets – in other words conducting arguments in a crucible constructed only
from an economic paradigm – pushes important sustainable development issues
like justice, history and human rights to the margins of consideration. An SDG
perspective on these debates may offer a fresh and productive take on what have
become entrenched and normalised pernicious features of the global economic
system.
Culture, Nature and Green Criminology
Thanks to the emerging green criminology, wildlife trafficking is seen as an
environmental crime, as well as a form of organised crime. The ecological
destruction inherent in wildlife crime is clearly conceived (White, 2010, 2011). At
least it is considerably more clearly conceived than the detrimental effects of
antiquities looting and trafficking. Whether the latter is an ‘environmental’ crime
or a ‘green’ issue is not a question that has so far elicited much, if any, discussion.
There are good reasons to think that holding antiquities crimes alongside green
criminology may be a productive move, though. Searching unlawfully for
antiquities can cause serious environmental destruction: witness the many photos
and satellite pictures of landscapes pock-marked by looters holes that pervade the
literature (Brodie, Doole, & Renfrew, 2001). Dense vegetation around jungle sites
are areas that are liable to be cut back to allow access to temples and shrines, and
where heavy machinery is used to facilitate the extraction the damage may be
considerable (Yates, 2014b).
Yet, for us, the most clarity in associating antiquities looting with green
criminology is achieved when cultural heritage sites are considered to be part of
the environment rather than just existing as repositories of man-made objects in or
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on the environment. In many places, temples and other structures have become
such an integral part of the landscape it is not really viable to think of them as
‘stuff’ on that landscape – rather these pieces of evidence of bygone civilisations
are the marks left on the landscape by our forebears and in that respect are as
much a part of the living environment as it now presents to us as are the forests or
deserts in which they sit. Likewise, deposits of antiquities buried underground
may surely at some point rightly come to be considered a ‘naturally occurring’
part of the environment, no different from other such deposits like fossil fuels or
gemstones, especially since their extraction involves environmentally destructive
practices precisely comparable to other types of resource extraction. We may not
be talking about fracking or massive deforestation here but look at the before/
after satellite feed of the Apamea site in Syria and make your own mind up about
whether looting is an environmental crime (see Fig. 20.1).1
With the SDGs now on the global agenda, the issue of whether certain criminal
trades are environmental crimes is not an intellectual indulgence but rather it
brings with it a raft of practical consequences. It is an interesting aspect of the
SDGs that they hint at this link between crimes against culture and crimes against
nature by including them both in Goal 11 while having an entirely separate goal
for the protection of ecosystems and biodiversity in Goal 15. UNODC engages
with Goals 11 and 15 by linking from both to a webpage outlining its strategy on
Wildlife and Forest Crime in the Southeast Asia and Pacific region. Clearly the
sense is that while from the perspective of development thinkers the two Goals are
about separate issues, when one takes a criminological view of matters it seems
that there is an emerging recognition here of culture/nature/environment as being a
cluster of ideas that cohere and ‘fit’ together as a group of interests to be protected.
A culture–nature nexus, if you will. This is a far cry from earlier notions of the
culture–nature divide, which pervades much of scholarly thinking and theorising.
Green criminology brings a set of conceptual tools and orientations that
encourages researchers to identify and uncover hidden exercises of power and in
that way orients us towards stripping corporate, state and market ideology away
from the framing of global environmental challenges (Lynch & Stretesky, 2014;
Ruggiero & South, 2010; White & Heckenberg, 2014). The sustainable
development issues facing culture and nature can in this vein be seen in the
context of a legacy of colonial ‘conquest and collection’ type of thinking which
once we have identified it can then be critiqued.
Trafficking Culture and Nature as Neocolonial Hegemony
Both of these policy domains, antiquities trafficking and wildlife trafficking, are in
some measure characterised by competing discourses that seek to establish
themselves as the appropriate way to interpret the activities in question: as normal
forms of international trade, as local and national issues of the discovery and use
of the natural and cultural environment or as crime. A frame of reference is
1https://traffickingculture.org/data/looting-at-apamea-recorded-via-google-earth/.
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needed that allows the debate to step out of the dichotomy of a ‘collecting versus
conservation’ viewpoint: this alternative frame needs to respect ideas including
human rights, global justice and cultural or communal ownership and interest in
heritage (Mackenzie & Yates, 2017).
Fig. 20.1. Impact of Antiquities Extraction at the Apamea Site in
Syria. Map data: Google, Maxar Technologies.
Global Trade in Stolen Culture and Nature as Neocolonial Hegemony 423
Trafficking Culture
The various forms of harm involved in trafficking culture are diminished in the
ethical debate about illicit antiquities by well-worn appeals to justifications and
excuses that depend on one accepting that certain considerations are more salient
than others: for example, that object preservation in homes and galleries, and
publication in museums and exhibitions, is more important than the archaeo-
logical record of excavation which is lost through looting (Cuno, 2008; Mack-
enzie, 2005). On the most fundamental level of social meaning, therefore, the
‘problem’ of looting and trafficking antiquities is a disputed object – the scare
quotes used because many collectors and dealers simply do not consider it a
problem at all (Mackenzie, 2013). Various attempts have been made over recent
decades to engage with this issue of a lack of an overall accepted reference
framework within which to place the unlawful extraction of antiquities and their
clandestine movement across borders as part of the global art market system.
On behalf of the international capitalists of the art market, one of the most
famous contributions to the collecting perspective has been made by John Henry
Merryman, a legal academic and self-styled ‘cultural internationalist’ (Merryman,
2005), whose central concern was with what he saw as the ‘retentionist’ policies of
source countries for antiquities (Merryman, 1988). He thought such retentionism
was unfair because it denied the aficionados of the Global North the opportunity
to indulge their passion for appreciating ancient art through collection. In his
view, cultural heritage was the property of all humankind – a position which has
been written through ongoing contemporary debates about the ethics and
responsibilities of ‘encyclopedic museums’ harbouring collections sourced from
around the world and inevitably including many items with dubious origins. For
contemporary acquisitions those dubious origins tend to involve a fake or absent
trail of provenance, and for older acquisitions the case is more likely to fall into
the category of the moral standards of yesteryear, where objects were collected in
a time when the whole issue of taking things from former colonies was viewed
very differently.
Trafficking Nature
Much of the global illegal trade in wildlife originates in biodiverse-rich nations in
the Global South. A common myth is that almost all wildlife is destined for Asian
markets (Margulies, Wong, & Duffy, 2019b). However, researchers have
consistently shown that illegal wildlife markets are spread across the globe,
including many sites located in Europe and Northern America (Floyd, 1998;
Hübschle, 2016; Margulies et al. 2019a; Reuter & O’Regan, 2017; Stiles, 2015).
The illegal wildlife trade has been identified as the fourth most lucrative organised
crime market in the world by several conservation and crime fighting organisa-
tions. This contention relies on the guestimate of researchers linked to Global
Financial Integrity (Harken, 2011). While the veracity of the statistics has been
questioned (Fioramonti, 2014), there is no doubt that the illegal wildlife trade is
affecting biodiversity and species extinction. Another common mistake is the
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assumption that all trade in wildlife is illegal when in fact, a great proportion of
trade in wildlife is considered legal and sustainable (Broad, Mulliken, & Roe,
2003). While organised crime networks are involved in some high-value trades
including charismatic megafauna (Rademeyer, 2016, pp. 1–64), caviar
(Zabyelina, 2014) and abalone (de Greef & Raemakers, 2014; Lambrechts &
Goga, 2016), wildlife industry professionals and individual collectors are involved
in the trade of less charismatic wildlife (Hübschle, 2017a; Wyatt, 2009). Many
illegal wildlife trades have distinct value and supply chains with their own set of
market mechanisms, drivers and dynamics (UNODC, 2016). There are a few
examples where convergence between illegal wildlife trade and other organised
crime activities has been observed (Hübschle & de Greef, 2016; Shelley, 2018).
However, scholars and law enforcement officials have rejected claims that the
illegal wildlife trade is linked to the funding of international terrorism (Duffy
et al. 2019; Maguire & Haenlein, 2015; Titeca & Edmond, 2019). There is growing
evidence of an interface between illegal wildlife markets and a bouquet of legal
economies and markets including, for example, real estate, construction and
banking (Hübschle, 2016; Hübschle & Shearing, 2020).
Criminologists have set the tone in the literature on wildlife trafficking by
describing the crime, profiling wildlife offenders and providing instrumental
explanations why wildlife crime is perpetrated, such as motivations to poach, and
structural or geographic drivers. Another stream of literature describes the illegal
wildlife trade as a ‘global supply chain’ or ‘global production chain’ that is
demand-driven and dominated by organised crime networks (van Uhm, 2016;
Wong, 2015; Wyatt, 2013). Many scholars describe the supply side of wildlife
markets, focussing almost exclusively on the first segment or stage of the supply
chain with little consideration of what happens further down the chain. Scholars
thus portray ‘poachers’ as the principal suppliers of wildlife contraband, ignoring
the role of the state, the wildlife industry, NGOs and criminal networks in the
overall market structure. The supply chain is split into source, transit and con-
sumer markets. As comparatively little is known about the transit zones and
consumer markets, remedial responses have largely focused on disrupting illegal
hunters, fishers, loggers and harvesters in source markets. These low-level sup-
pliers have been on the receiving end of disproportionate often militarised
responses, while organisers, intermediaries, traffickers and traders remain
unscathed and largely untouchable.
Wildlife conservation often clashes with local interests. A CITES listing on one
of the three Appendices or regulatory change at the domestic level can render
someone’s livelihood strategy an illegal activity. This person may have been a
fisher, hunter or woodcutter in the past and from one day to the next is considered
to be breaking the law and branded a poacher, illegal fisher or illegal logger.
Heritage, Modernisation and Development
Another benefit of drawing remedial responses to crimes against natural and
cultural heritage sites together for analysis is the comparably problematic use of
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the ‘heritage’ concept in both discourses. In the arena of nature conservation, the
concept of ‘natural heritage’ invokes problematic colonial and somewhat archaic
tropes which tally with notions of game parks as African configurations of the
Garden of Eden or Teddy Roosevelt’s labelling of Yosemite National Park as ‘a
great solemn cathedral’. While appreciation of nature is not wrong per se, the
notion of heritage is muddied in controversies. In the African version of con-
servation, local and indigenous people have been excluded from conservation
since the first antipoaching measures were introduced in colonial times (Car-
ruthers, 1995, 2017; Garland, 2008). So-called ‘fortress conservation’ reifies an
approach that seeks to preserve wildlife and their habitat through the forceful
exclusion of local people from conservation areas. Local people are portrayed as
the enemies of wildlife and of protected areas, which are preserved or restored
through Western science, expertise and donations (Brockington, 2002; Igoe,
2002). In recent years, the paradigm has included conservationist notions of
‘biodiversity’, ‘payment for ecosystems services’, ‘transfrontier conservation’ and
community-based natural resource management initiatives which promote the
view that local people should benefit from conservation projects (Igoe, 2002;
Ramutsindela, 2007). However, in reality, conservation and most protected areas
remain in the exclusive realm of globetrotting elites who spend tourist dollars to
preserve these natural heritage sites. The questions arising here are whose heritage
are we protecting and at what cost? These sites of natural heritage continue to be
seen as colonial implants that benefit the few rather than locals who bear the costs
of living near dangerous wildlife.
Debates about the use of the idea of ‘heritage’ in the literature on trafficking
culture similarly point out the loaded meaning of the term, and for some authors
the caprice of local government approaches in ‘heritisation’ of certain areas of
interest (Panella, 2014), which can substantially change in one sweep of the leg-
islative pen the lived experiences of those whose daily routines have interacted with
local monuments and sites of historical interest, sometimes going back genera-
tions. Again this heritisation discourse is seen as a product of a global museums
and collecting field, in which the idea of heritage is really a byword for opening up
local issues into global issues and allowing the long arm of colonialism, in the
contemporary shape of neoliberal market and conservation interests, to reach in.
The proposition that neocolonial perspectives and a ‘west-first’ worldview may
be part of the backdrop to contemporary issues in development studies is not new.
For some time, development has been critiqued as: ‘necessitat[ing] the diffusion
and adaptation of Western values, and help[ing] risk-taking (and Westernized)
entrepreneurs produce goods and services for the purposes of economic growth
(Rostow, 1960)’ (Blaustein, Pino, Fitz-Gibbon, & White, 2018, p. 4). This is the
so-called ‘modernisation’ approach, in which:
…the strategic concerns of [wealthy countries], rather than [less
wealthy countries], were prioritized in development aid schemes,
and … modernization-inspired development programmes served
to increase debt and inequality both within and between nation
states (Blaustein et al. 2018, p. 5; Cordoso, 1972; Dos Santo, 1970)
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While antiquities looting, wildlife poaching and trafficking can hardly be seen
as any kind of official ‘development scheme’ for source countries, there is a strong
sense in the pro-market discourse that there is an overall ‘inward investment’ type
of benefit for source countries to be found in the current global system which
extracts ancient artefacts and endangered wildlife from poorer countries and
transports them to richer ones. The premises of the modernisation thesis also
remain evident in other aspects of the contemporary antiquities discourse, where a
considerable part of the justification for collecting in the Global North is seen to
be the observed incapacity of ‘source’ countries in the Global South to protect,
preserve and maintain their significant cultural objects to the standards consid-
ered appropriate by the connoisseurs of the art market. In curbing antiquities
trafficking, expensive and state-of-the art methods such as climate-controlled
rooms, theft- and fire-proof display cabinets, security guards and surveillance/
alarm systems are beyond the reach of many source countries. In so failing the
particular requirements of preservation standards established in the Global
North, these source countries are seen by many art market entrepreneurs as
undeserving of the cultural and natural riches scattered throughout the territories
they govern. This version of the ‘if only they were more like us’ critique is of
course simply a particular characterisation of that overall theme, which is seen
more widely in the ‘modernisation’ perspective on development as well as in the
postcolonial perspective in criminology (Cunneen, 2011).
Similar narratives are pervasive with regards to wildlife conservation in the
Global South. Implicit in notions like ‘global commons’ and ‘shared heritage’ are
neocolonial framings of citizens of the South being too corrupt, too lackadaisical
and too capacity-constrained to take care of wildlife. These framings have
translated into concrete changes with regards to protected area management. For
example, several transnational conservation areas, community-based natural
resource management conservancies and some national parks in southern Africa
are run or co-managed by private entities or through public–private partnerships.
Non-state actors and institutions are thus controlling huge swaths of land put
aside for conservation purposes. Local government actors and local communities
have been pushed aside as powerful international interests vie for position and
control of the ‘global commons’ (Spierenburg, Steenkamp, & Wels, 2006; Spier-
enburg & Wels, 2010; Zerner, 1999).
A lot more financial support is made available to fight wildlife crime than
trafficking culture. Responses to wildlife crime include state-of-the-art technolo-
gies like unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and artificial intelligence. According
to a report released by the Global Environmental Facility (2016, p. 9), 24 inter-
national donors committed more than US $ 1.3 billion to fight illegal wildlife
trade in Africa and Asia between 2010 and June 2016. There have been many
more direct and indirect cash injections by private individuals and companies who
donate to conservation NGOs and social media interest groups or via online
campaigns and crowdfunding initiatives. The lion’s share of these financial
commitments goes towards law enforcement and antipoaching operations,
including the development and implementation of new technologies while training
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and education, awareness raising campaigns and research also receive their fair
share.
Funds are used to equip and train rangers and security personnel, as well as the
acquisition of new equipment and technologies (Hübschle, 2017b). In some cases,
conservation authorities have enrolled the assistance of security and military
officials, private investigators and private military and security companies to
assist with antipoaching. As is often the case, financial support comes with strings
attached, including preferred supplier networks, technical experts and technolo-
gies. Critical voices have questioned the efficacy of the antipoaching approach
and are asking for accountability in light of the enormous disbursements made to
the military–industrial complex (Barichievy, Munro, Clinning, Whittington-
Jones, & Masterson, 2017). A new school of thought critiques militarised
responses to poaching, arguing that conservation authorities and their partners
are waging a ‘war on poaching’ with long-term consequences for conservation
management and community relations (Duffy et al. 2019).
Collectors Who Want to Collect versus Protectors Who Want to Protect
In the antiquities and wildlife spheres, we can therefore see two different versions
of the modernisation perspective, with each in different ways asking ‘developing’
countries to open their markets, resources and regulations to opportunities which
can more efficiently be exploited by international capitalists.
The antiquities and wildlife markets are founded in colonialism and empire,
and this association has received significant scholarly attention (Hübschle, 2016;
Yates, Mackenzie, & Smith, 2017). The deposition of so much of the ancient art
and cultural and natural heritages of colonised countries in the major museums of
the west is a well-known example of the uneven benefits of colonial arrangements,
being a process of cultural, natural and economic enrichment by the dominant
powers, very much at the expense of those they were subjugating. As is being
increasingly acknowledged, both explicitly through discourse and public apology
and implicitly through repatriations and returns of significant objects of ancient
art to their countries of origin, the exploitative foundations of many of the great
world collections are unsustainable in the moral climate of the present day.
The economic discourse of the last 30 or so years has turned to neoliberal
globalisation with its emphasis on the liberalisation of capital markets and an
associated push towards deregulation. For the antiquities market, this kind of
‘open borders’ discourse around trade, development and internationalisation is
simply more grist to the Merryman-type cultural internationalism mentioned.
Lightly-, going on un-, regulated global free trade is precisely the preferred
context for the international market in illicit cultural heritage, since it legitimises
the illicit economic practices inherent in illegal trade both in terms of practicality
and philosophy. In a world captivated by the purported benefits of global flows of
goods and capital, barriers to free trade are anathema. For us to resist this dogma,
a frame of reference is needed that allows the debate to step out of a strictly
economic viewpoint: this alternative frame needs to respect ideas including
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human rights, global justice and cultural or communal ownership and interest in
heritage (Mackenzie & Yates, 2017).
The debates in wildlife conservation are slightly different. There is an
increasing sense that trade regulation and prohibition are leading to untenable
high prices of wildlife contraband (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009) and the increasing
viability of illegal wildlife markets in the short-term until the sought-after wildlife
goes extinct. The CITES system of regulation has been critiqued as a regulatory
tool that reflects the preferences of powerful elite factions in the northern hemi-
sphere that do not have to live with or in close vicinity of dangerous wildlife. A
north–south divide and the perceived politicisation of CITES became increasingly
evident when the African elephant was moved from Appendix II to Appendix I
and the trade ban of ivory products entered into force in 1989. In the run-up to the
ban, Western conservation NGOs had campaigned in favour of prohibition. The
CITES proposal was adopted despite objections from nine southern African
elephant range states, and Japan and China. Back then the elephant populations
were considered stable or rising in most of southern Africa. Matters climaxed
when a group of southern African countries threatened to withdraw from CITES
at the eighth Conference of Parties held in Kyoto. The southern African faction
felt that CITES listings were increasingly used for political purposes, and listing
decisions were not based on sound scientific data (Mofson, 2000; interview data).
Several southern African countries were considering whether to deposit reserva-
tions in response to tougher or unchanged trade restrictions in the aftermath of
the CITES CoP 18 held in Geneva in 2019. Such reservations if indeed deposited
could suspend restrictions in elephant, rhino and elephant trade.
Back in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the disputed elephant listing triggered a
larger debate over which conservation paradigms the CITES regime should
employ and the sustainable use paradigm was pitted against the preservation
paradigm (Mofson, 2000). The southern African faction advocated the sustain-
able use of wildlife as a conservation tool. According to this paradigm, conser-
vation agencies, local communities and private farmers should be provided with
financial, material and other incentives to protect wildlife. CITES tends to focus
on the global level of imperilment of a species when determining its listing. In
essence, regardless of its status in individual range states, if a species is deemed as
endangered at the global level, then its trade may be banned. Through this
approach, CITES treats natural resources within individual countries as part of
the global commons (Castley & Hall–Martin, 2003). The listing process has been
subject to scathing criticism by countries affected by such decisions. Western
experts, scientists and lobbyists are seen as the main catalysts behind the listing of
threatened species. Broad consultation with communities that are affected by such
listings is perceived to be lacking.
The conservation ideology underpinning the CITES regime in its early days
excluded the possibility that trade may hold benefits for species, ecosystems or
local people (Martin, 2000, p. 29). While illegal trade might be the principal threat
to the survival of endangered species, trade regulations may be inappropriate in
dealing with threats such as human encroachment, climate change or organised
crime. It was assumed that trade regulation constituted the most effective way of
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achieving conservationist goals (Dickson, 2003) but listings do not only affect the
wild fauna and flora that CITES seeks to protect – they also affect the people who
live in close proximity to wildlife. In 1992, CITES recognised with Resolution 8.3
that the majority of species it sought to protect were located in the Global South.
It also acknowledged that the sustainable use of wild fauna and flora, irrespective
of being consumptive or nonconsumptive, provided a viable economic option to
local and indigenous peoples (CITES, 1992). Moreover, it was accepted that
unless conservation programmes took into account the needs of local people, and
provided incentives for sustainable use of wild fauna and flora, conversion to
alternate forms of land use might occur (Wijnsteker, 2003). To this day, the issue
of sustainable use constitutes a highly contentious issue at CITES Conferences of
Parties (CoPs). There is a significant lobby within the environmental movement
(predominantly located in the Global North with strategic partners and offices
located around the globe) that is vehemently opposed to any trade in animal
species, particularly when it is premised on the killing of these animals (Dickson,
2003). This lobby continues to hold considerable sway at CITES, directly and
indirectly affecting decisions that lead to restrictions on trade in wildlife. Some
southern countries object to the strong influence of animal rights and conservation
NGOs at CITES. The antiuse stance is seen as an illegitimate imposition of
specific moral values on the wider conservation community.
Sustainable Development as Postcolonial Resistance?
Against the free-market discourse that supports illicit trade in culture and nature,
and the protectionist conservation discourse which in some influential versions
limits consideration of local interests, thinking about these problems in terms of
sustainability can bring new and different reflections. Let us indicate some of
these sustainability insights now.
Thinking first in terms of economic sustainability, the pro-market discourse
around global resource-extractive trades implies that wealth trickles down the
chain of supply such that consumer purchases in rich countries provide an income
for the residents of the poorer source countries (Mackenzie, 2005). This dubious
wealth-distribution mechanism is sometimes stretched to presumptively include
illicitly obtained commodities along with legal international trade (Fitz Gibbon,
2005).
In the case of illicit antiquities, this argument has been addressed by Brodie
who has argued that there is little evidence to support it in practice, and that in
fact there is little reason even in principle to think that it would work as described
(Brodie, 2010). Antiquities looting is a ‘one-shot’ form of personal enrichment,
with any profit going only to the original looter rather than being spread among
the community living in the area of the find. For that community there is detri-
ment, rather than benefit, in the looting, since it deprives them of the longer-term
economic benefit that might be obtained from the lost objects, in terms of tourism
or lending and display rights. Even the looter achieves only relatively small
economic benefit from the crime and it has been suggested that the original looter
430 Simon Mackenzie et al.
can usually expect to obtain less than 1 percent of the final sale price of the
artefact once it has made its way into the international market and been bought
by a museum or collector (Brodie, 1998). The biggest cut goes to the intermedi-
aries – the international traffickers – who are hardly a group contributing to
sustainable development nor on the list of those in need of benefitting from the
UN goals.
With regards to wildlife poaching, recent research on illicit flows of rhino horn
(Hübschle, 2016, 2017a; Hübschle & Shearing, 2018) shows that rhino poachers
claim to be fulfilling important societal functions such as social welfare, com-
munity development and political leadership. Akin to latter-day Robin Hoods,
they see rhino horn as instrumental in achieving these altruistic goals in an
environment where the state is largely absent or failing to deliver public services.
However, the trickle-down of rhino profits to the broader community is debat-
able. Many impoverished communities living on the edge of protected areas
appear to benefit to some degree, others less so or indirectly (Hübschle, 2017c).
Direct handouts include village parties, meat and traditional beer provisions and
financial help with school fees. In some instances, wildlife criminals have con-
structed small roads, boreholes, convenience shops and bars (Hübschle 2017c).
Compared to the meagre livelihoods of most rural communities, wildlife criminals
have purchasing power, allowing them to buy greater volumes of goods and
services, which indirectly benefits community members. These modest local
benefits are, however, tempered by an awareness that there is a ceiling to rhino
horn fortunes: poachers acknowledged the existential threat to rhinos through
poaching and that they would have to seek new sources of income or return to
their old ones once the rhinos were gone (Hübschle & Shearing, 2018). The influx
of hard cash into some communities has also had negative consequences,
including increased alcohol consumption, illicit drug use and prostitution
(Hübschle & Shearing, 2018, pp. 17–18). As with antiquities trafficking, the
biggest cut of the poaching profits goes to the international traffickers and traders.
Research interviews by the second author with poachers, traffickers and law
enforcers have documented that rhino poachers are paid 6%–10% of the final
price that rhino horn trades for in illegal markets. Similar examples of this uneven
realisation of the benefits from wildlife contraband are observable in other wildlife
economies, such as elephant ivory, abalone and orchids.
Second, we can consider the issue of social sustainability. Crimes against
culture and nature fracture and fragment communities. The wildlife crime liter-
ature has for some time included discussion of the rights of local populations to
sustainably ‘use’ their wildlife and local ecosystems, as we have mentioned. The
incursion of Western norms that speak almost exclusively in terms of protection
and preservation make little room for these sorts of sustainable use cases, and the
clash of values between locals and their representatives on one hand, and inter-
national wildlife protection groups on the other, has become a heated dispute
invoking accusations of neocolonialism, paternalism and self-interest (Hübschle &
Shearing, 2020; Mabele, 2017; Neumann, 1998). Likewise, in the debate about
‘who owns’ cultural heritage (i.e., local populations, or the world), social cohesion
is threatened (Cuno, 2008; De Montebello, 2007; Fitz Gibbon, 2005). The looting
Global Trade in Stolen Culture and Nature as Neocolonial Hegemony 431
of cultural artefacts and the world trade that drives this leaves cultural groups
who identify with artefacts to deal with the aftermath of the losses they experience
through these thefts. Studies have found that emotions can run deep in relation to
the communal experience of victimhood by way of cultural theft, and in her case
studies of policing cultural heritage crime in Latin America, Yates has recorded
community reactions as extreme as lynching suspects (Yates, 2014a). This seems
to be most likely to occur where the police have become perceived as a distant and
uninterested institution of guardianship, and communities fall back into taking
the law into their own hands (Yates, 2014a).
Finally, third, we can consider sustainability as a question of justice. Both
source and market states, and their constituent actors, have claims to make based
on fairness in relation to the prospective movement of culture and nature around
the world. The exploitative potential of such global market forces in relation to
the illicit extraction of resource from source countries has already been made clear
(Efrat, 2012; Naylor, 2011), and a social justice approach to sustainable devel-
opment would charge us with reducing and preventing those adverse effects as
much as possible. On the other side, the pro-market lobby asks why should those
who love to appreciate, preserve, collect or use the artefacts of culture or nature
be unduly restricted in their capacity to do this by the fact that these items are
sequestered away inside the jurisdictional boundaries of other countries that
decline to share them in a way the market would appreciate?
This type of thinking prompts consideration of whether broader and higher
principles, like those set out in the SDGs, can help to resolve questions of justice
when the direction would otherwise be muddied, if not unclear, were we to engage
in conciliatory attempts to mediate a resolution to global arguments based on self-
interest alone. The SDGs represent the condensed version of a much wider con-
versation between nation states about matters of justice and fairness in sustainable
development, and as such can make a legitimate claim to be a touchstone for
mutually accepted social justice sensibilities as negotiated by the world commu-
nity, as much as it is represented in the UN.
The relations between global justice and local deprivation, and between
international human rights and local understandings of normative conduct, are
quite obviously complex – but the constellation of ideas involved in the concept of
sustainable development speaks well to the possibilities of a less fractured future
relationship between local and global populations and the world’s most precious
cultural and natural heritage sites.
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